# AFF – OSCE CP

### 2AC – Perm do the CP

#### All NATO member’s are in the OSCE – the counterplan engages with their individual member states that is obviously a way the plan could be done

GLOBE [GLOBE, “NATO/EU/OSCE Membership overlap,” GLOBE, <https://www.globe-project.eu/en/nato-eu-osce-membership-overlap_11001#:~:text=As%20for%20the%20OSCE%2C%20all,OSCE%20alone%20(figure%20D).]\\pairie>

The membership of NATO, the EU and the OSCE overlap to a large degree (figures A and B). Moreover, this membership overlap has increased, especially after NATO’s and the EU’s eastern expansions, driving increased interaction, but also causing several interorganizational problems.

NATO, with a total of 30 member states, and the EU, consisting of 27, share 21 member states (figure C). The member states that are only a member of the EU and not of NATO are five neutral EU states (Austria, Finland, Ireland, Malta and Sweden) as well as Cyprus. The member states that are only a member of NATO and not of the EU are six European states (Albania, Iceland, North Macedonia, Norway, Turkey and the UK), as well as the two North American members: Canada and the USA.

As for the OSCE, all the EU states and all NATO states also participate in the OSCE. Thus, of its total of 57 member states, the OSCE shares 27 with the EU and 30 with NATO, leaving a total of 23 states as participants in the OSCE alone (figure D).

### 2AC – INB – No Moldova Impact

#### No Moldova impact – Russia won’t invade they have already sustained heavy losses

Parker 22 [Claire Parker, 04-26-2022, “What is Transnistria, and will Russia advance toward Moldova?, The Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/04/22/ukraine-moldova-transnistria-russia/]\\pairie

How likely is a Russian advance toward the region?

Not very, analysts say.

Russia has reoriented its military efforts on gaining control of the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine, after attempts to seize Kyiv, the capital, and broader swaths of Ukraine failed. The Russian military has sustained heavy losses during its two-month assault and significant battlefield reversals that surprised many observers and exposed its weaknesses.

“The conversation about Transnistria is a complete canard,” said Michael Kofman, a Russia expert at CNA, a nonprofit research and analysis organization in Arlington, Va. “The Russian military has no capacity for this kind of offensive. It’s very likely that they will be a spent force after the offensive in Donbas.”

Kofman said the statement from Minnekaev, the Russian commander, that Moscow intended to take control of southern Ukraine wasn’t new. “They literally tried this in phase one,” he said.

Russian attempts to advance beyond the southern Ukrainian city of Mykolaiv made little headway, leaving southwestern Ukraine under Kyiv’s control.

Moldova’s foreign minister, Nicu Popescu, said at an event hosted by the German Marshall Fund in Washington this week that the situation in Transnistria is “more or less calm” and that Moldova had not seen signs of any unusual military activity there.

### 2AC – INB – Not Key

#### OSCE not key to Moldova conflict prevention – past empirics prove

Khorolskaya 22 [Maria Khorolskaya, 01-01-2022, “OSCE’s Involvement in Conflict Resolution Across the Post-Soviet Space, moderndiplomacy, https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2022/01/01/osces-involvement-in-conflict-resolution-across-the-post-soviet-space/]\\pairie

The OSCE participated in the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict once its most acute phase had been overcome. In particular, the organisation was puzzled by the signing of a ceasefire agreement and the establishment of the Joint Control Commission (JCC), consisting of representatives of the armed forces of Moldova, Russia and the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic. According to its mandate, the mission should assist in laying the groundwork for dialogue between Chisinau and Tiraspol, collecting information about the situation in the region, providing consultations, and encouraging negotiations on the conclusion of an agreement on the status of the PMR and the withdrawal of foreign troops. Late in 1999, the mandate of the OSCE mission was expanded with the additional task of “ensuring transparency of the removal and destruction of Russian ammunition and armaments”.

The participation of the OSCE mission in the settlement of the crisis is ensured both through observers and through involvement in the negotiation process. The OSCE, along with Russia and Ukraine, is a guarantor of the 5+2 format. Over 28 years, the mission has helped to resolve a number of issues, including the opening of traffic on the bridge across the Dnieper River near the village of Gura Bîcului, providing Moldovan farmers with access to plots in the Dubăsari District of Transnistria, recognition of documents and license plates, etc. However, one cannot speak of a substantial intermediary contribution by the OSCE to the conflict resolution process. Progress in this process can only be achieved by changing the policies of the leading actors. Thus, the proposals of the mission representatives on possible ways out of the crisis did not find support in Chisinau and Tiraspol (1993 Report No. 13 by T. Williams, Head of Mission, proposing a special status for Transdniestria) [4].

### 2AC – INB – OSCE Fails

#### It fails – every country has an effective veto power which makes punishing aggressors impossible

Garibov 16 [Azad Garibov, 05-11-2016, “Why the OSCE Keeps Failing to Make Peace in Nagorno-Karabakh, The National Interest, [https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/why-the-osce-keeps-failing-make-peace-nagorno-karabakh-16161]\\pairie](https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/why-the-osce-keeps-failing-make-peace-nagorno-karabakh-16161%5d\\pairie)

Above all, it should be noted that the OSCE is an intergovernmental organization with no supranational powers. This intergovernmentalism means that any OSCE activity in any member country, and any mission deployed on behalf of the organization, is subject to unanimous approval from all member states, and particularly the country to which the activity or mission pertains. Thus, every country in the organization has an effective veto power on any decision. In 1996 the OSCE was unable to include the famous “three principles” (the territorial integrity of both countries, self-determination for Nagorno-Karabakh in the form of the highest degree of self-rule within Azerbaijan, and guaranteed security for Nagorno-Karabakh and its whole population) in the Lisbon declaration due to Armenia’s objection, despite winning the support of 53 out of 54 member states. This essential systemic weakness constrains the OSCE’s effectiveness in many cases, including in conflict areas when there is need to punish aggressors and protect victims.

In considering shortcomings peculiar to Minsk Group itself, the biggest problem is that it tries not to hurt anyone. The Minsk Group tries to seem neutral, and this near-obsession with neutrality does not allow it to be fair and impartial. It is claimed that openly naming Armenia as an aggressor country and calling for the fulfillment of U.N. Security Council resolutions—which entails unconditional withdrawal of forces from Nagorno-Karabakh—might discredit the OSCE Minsk group in the eyes of Armenian side. However, it does not mean that OSCE can play this game of neutrality over justice forever. The Minsk Group’s co-chairs avoid making clear-cut statements about their positions on Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. They avoid bringing up the fact of occupation; they make general and vague statements at best, or indeed make contradictory declarations depending on whether they are in Baku or Yerevan. In so doing, they claim that they are addressing the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. However, when there is need for a firm position, the co-chairs state that Armenia and Azerbaijan should find a solution themselves since it is their problem, and that the Minsk Group will support any decision they make. This attitude and the visible failure of shuttle diplomacy has resulted in such widespread distrust in OSCE Minsk Group’s activity that the Azerbaijani media has begun to re­fer to the co-chairs’ visits to the region as “tourist excursions.”

The lack of interest and consequent lack of commitment on the part of the OSCE Minsk Group co-chair countries to the resolution process is another visible setback. The co-chairs seem to be dealing much more with “conflict management”—trying to reduce the tensions between parties via occasional visits to re­gion—than with a “conflict resolution mechanism”. The Minsk group has monopolized the resolution process of the conflict, but lacks the needed commitment to push the process forward. This lack of commitment is also seen in the form of the low level of involvement by co-chair countries in the resolution process. The involvement of more mid- or high-level diplomats and politicians might prove effective in accelerating the peace process. Talks that carry high-level international commitment—such as the 2001 Key West negotiations, which involved the US president George Bush—might be a necessary change, given that this low-profile shuttle diplomacy seems to be failing. History shows that when major powers are interested and committed, they are able to facilitate effective negotiations to find a solution to the complex conflicts similar to Nagorno-Karabakh. To give comparable examples, during the bloody dissolution of Yugoslavia, the U.S. commitment and appointment of a special representative was key in hammering out the 1995 Dayton Agreement, while French president Jacques Chirac’s personal involvement played the same role in reaching the 1999 Rambouillet Accords.

Moreover, if in the beginning OSCE involvement as a mediator was intended to represent impartial international involvement, today the OSCE Minsk Group’s approach is a troika-based approach rather than a genuine and inclusive OSCE approach. The OSCE seems to have little influence over the Minsk Group; three chair states are in a full control of the process. On top of that, the three members of troika have their own divergent positions on the peace process, which further hampers the prospect of successful negotiations. Russia has frequently sought to dominate the process, while the United States increased its attention when its stakes rose in the South Caucasus. Moreover, the domestic considerations of these three countries also play a certain role in their approach to the peace process and conflict parties. The three co-chair countries are home to the largest, wealthiest and best-organized Armenian diasporas. For instance, at the beginning of the 1990s, the Armenian lobby managed to block U.S. financial support to Azerbaijan under the “Free­dom Support Act” (FSA) program; in addition, the US ambassadorial nominee to Azerbaijan in 2010 was blocked by influential senators representing U.S. states with powerful Armenian communities. It should also be noted that Moscow is Yerevan’s closest strategic ally, and Armenia is frequently claimed to have de facto protectorate-metropolis relations with Russia.

#### OSCE structurally fails – deep internal divisions and political crises can’t be resolved by the counterplan

Günther 22 [Mirco Günther, 02-15-2022, “We have an institution to ensure peace in Europe,” <<Mirco heads the FES Regional Office in Asia>>, IPS, [https://www.ips-journal.eu/topics/foreign-and-security-policy/we-have-an-institution-to-ensure-peace-in-europe-5716/]\\pairie](https://www.ips-journal.eu/topics/foreign-and-security-policy/we-have-an-institution-to-ensure-peace-in-europe-5716/%5d\\pairie)

The OSCE is mired in permanent crisis, verging on paralysis. Because of the OSCE’s deep internal divisions and the prevailing consensus rule, however, far-reaching decisions are rather the exception. When they do happen, OSCE decisions carry considerable normative weight – as with the establishment of the OSCE monitoring mission at the onset of the Ukraine crisis in 2014. Sadly, such diplomatic success stories are rare. The OSCE is mired in permanent crisis, verging on paralysis. The Swedish chairmanship in 2021 ended with few substantive achievements. The OSCE-hosted Human Dimension Implementation Meeting, Europe’s largest human rights conference, was blocked by Russia. Election monitoring missions are regularly disputed. Agreements are reached only with great difficulty, if at all, even on largely operational matters, such as the annual budget or the agenda for the annual security conference. In 2020, the Organization stared into the abyss when, in an unprecedented leadership crisis, its four most important posts lay vacant for several months, including that of secretary general. What is the OSCE? All these challenges stem from fundamental differences concerning the OSCE’s core purpose. Western states emphasise the Organization’s uniquely comprehensive approach to security, encompassing political-military, economic, environmental, and human rights issues, which emerged from Helsinki. A number of eastern participating countries have strong reservations about its human rights agenda. If the OSCE were to be founded today, it is almost inconceivable that an agreement could be reached on its very principles, including the Paris Charter for Europe’s post-Cold War order. Over the years, there have been more than one attempt to bring about meaningful reforms, but to little avail. It seems unlikely that future OSCE chairs will have more success: Poland this year, followed by North Macedonia, Estonia (to be confirmed) and Finland. The price of peace Many actors bear responsibility for the OSCE’s sorry state. Moscow, for example, has repeatedly weakened OSCE mandates and operational capabilities, while at the same time lamenting the Organization’s lacking relevance. Countries like Armenia and Azerbaijan often obstruct even the simplest decisions on procedural matters, following a logic of national rivalry. Various host countries have limited the mandates of OSCE field operations, although it needs to be recognised that this is their sovereign right. Western countries, too, have sold the OSCE short, preferring other organisations or bilateral formats. Moreover, many states continue to prioritise austerity policies and fail to give the Organization the financial resources it needs. The presence of unarmed international observers along the contact line in Eastern Ukraine has made a significant difference. At the same time, there is rarely any other organisation in the world that offers security at a more reasonable price. Its regular annual budget of around €138 million is modest by international standards. The Ukraine observation mission has a separate budget of around €100 million. In 2020, the OSCE had more than 3,500 staff from 51 countries in 20 locations. Its achievements are considerable, as the Ukraine conflict highlights. A key role in Ukraine The presence of unarmed international observers along the contact line in Eastern Ukraine has made a significant difference, albeit often far away from public awareness. Local Ukrainians have worked side by side with Americans, Russians, and Europeans. According to a report by the observers, between July 2019 and October 2021 the OSCE mediated more than 3,000 local ceasefires. Repair works on critical water and electricity infrastructure have given millions of civilians access to fundamental services. In publicly available daily reports, the OSCE documents compliance (and any non-compliance) with the 2015 Minsk Protocol and is an indispensable neutral voice on the ground. With this in mind, it is greatly worrying that some participating states have decided to pull out their observers fearing further escalation. There are a number of reasons why the OSCE’s important work does not receive broader attention. For one thing, its observers are often subjected to obstructions. They are denied access to the relevant regions and sites, their freedom of movement is restricted, and OSCE unmanned aerial drones are interfered with or shot down. The Organization registered a total of 93,902 ceasefire violations in 2021, which exceeds its capacity to broker ceasefires many times. Moreover, given the current geopolitical dynamics and fast-paced high-level diplomacy on the world stage, the often cumbersome de-escalation work in the very conflict zone tends to get less attention. A future platform for European security In light of all this, what role can the OSCE play in pursuit of a future European security order? As in any organisation, this ultimately comes down to the political will of the participating states. A number of OSCE key actors currently exhibit a lack of such will. As things stand, the most obvious approach – namely not to re-invent the wheel but to dust off the organisation and reinvigorate it – is therefore hardly an option. In the long run, however, we will need a joint platform for European security. The crisis of the OSCE is not of operational or technical nature, but deeply political. Needless to say that this is profoundly regrettable, given its unique wealth of experience in early warning and conflict prevention, as well as crisis management and resolution, and its tried-and-tested toolbox of confidence-building measures – among them the mechanism about ‘unusual military activities’ under the OSCE Vienna Document Ukraine is using to seek clarification from Russia.

### 2AC – INB – OSCE Fails – Ukraine

#### OSCE is a complete failure – an OSCE state has invading Ukraine proves

Bloed 22 [Arie Bloed, 02-25-2022, “Is this the death of the OSCE Decalogue?”, Security and Human Rights Monitor, https://www.shrmonitor.org/is-this-the-death-of-the-osce-decalogue/]\\pairie

At the same time it also means that an organization like the OSCE has failed in all respects to ensure the fulfillment of its key function, i.e. ensuring a stable environment in the OSCE area through its cooperative and comprehensive security approach. In particular in the post-Cold War period the OSCE became an impressive ‘community of values’ and ‘community of responsibility’. At the Astana Summit, just 11 years ago, there was even talk of a joint vision of a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security. By adhering to a constantly developing number of basic norms and values in the OSCE region, the East-West divide turned into a region with largely common norms and values, not only in the area of peace and security, but also in the areas of the human and the economic and environmental dimensions.

What is more, OSCE participating states did not only aim at the development of a highly sophisticated system of norms and rules, but also at a system that aimed at providing each other support, whenever countries were considered to be in need of help. This ‘joint responsibility’ for the fulfilment of the basic norms and standards, based on the idea of “indivisible security” has been fatally affected in the case of the Russian military attack against Ukraine since a key OSCE state refused to comply with the most fundamental rules which it had helped create itself.

The ‘community of responsibility’, however, is also largely ignored by the other OSCE states, which of course are competing with each other in condemning the Russian actions in words, but at the same time refusing to provide meaningful help to the Ukrainian government and people by only imposing non-military sanctions. Furthermore, there were few serious attempts within the OSCE during the past few months and years to move beyond stubborn public diplomacy to real negotiations on resolving the crisis in and around Ukraine. Also this behavior has made the community of responsibility as a core element of the OSCE philosophy of promoting peace and security in the Eurasian area void of a substantial meaning. If a partner such as Ukraine which is overrun by a much more powerful army by another OSCE state and then is largely left on its own, the philosophy of a ‘family of nations’ has been totally undermined.

The Russian occupation of the Crimea in 2014 was already a clear sign that the Russian Federation was acting in violation of the most fundamental principles of international law, but at least it still made an effort to show that it felt obliged to take these principles seriously, for instance through the organization of a (fraudulent) referendum about Crimea joining the Russian territory as an act of ‘self-determination’. In the case of the war against Ukraine the Russian authorities are going further by not even making a serious effort anymore to reconcile their military acts with the ‘law book’.

Instead it is playing now by the old-fashioned, 19th-century book of power politics and geographical expansionism to ensure its ‘national security’, no longer hindered by legal niceties such as principles of non-aggression, inviolability of borders or non-interference in internal affairs – principles that were already enshrined in the UN Charter to save future generations from the scourge of war.

The result is that the European continent (and the world) has been thrown back into a political nightmare where the carefully developed checks and balances in the volatile international security system have been discarded and where the world has been thrown back in a security jungle where power politics has taken over from basic principles and norms. The damage caused by this unilateral Russian action goes way beyond the bilateral Russian-Ukrainian relation and is dangerously undermining the whole system which has given Europe a longer period of peace than ever before.

Although the OSCE has achieved a lot over the past decades, in particular also in the most challenging environments, the open Russian aggression against a neighbouring country is the most serious crisis which the OSCE has faced in its existence. As a matter of fact, the basis on which the organization has been functioning has been largely taken away.

#### OSCE is has structural problems their failure in Ukraine proves

Semeniy 22 [Oleksiy Semeniy, June 2022, “IMPLICATIONS OF THE WAR IN UKRAINE FOR THE OSCE,”<<Dr Semeniy is a Direct of Institute for Global Transformations>>, OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions, [https://osce-network.net/fileadmin/user\_upload/OSCE\_Network\_Perspectives\_2022\_20June\_final.pdf]\\pairie](https://osce-network.net/fileadmin/user_upload/OSCE_Network_Perspectives_2022_20June_final.pdf%5d\\pairie)

Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine is a vital test for the OSCE. For many years the OSCE has been seen as failing to prevent or de-escalate (not to even mention sustainably settle) conflicts in Europe. It now needs to be united and deliver feasible results to remain a useful element of European security. However, its activity in Ukraine from 2014 until 24 February 2022 was also partially successful in organizational terms. It is worthy of astonishment how swiftly the OSCE succeeded in reorienting its country office and launched its special monitoring mission (SMM) in Ukraine in 2014. For those eight years the SMM was mostly an effective tool for many de-escalatory efforts and a number of successful solutions were implemented to tackle problems on the line of contact. But these successes were not enough and were underpinned by a lack of political backing in Vienna, due to growing political drifts and conflicts among some participating States, as well as a number of problems with efficiency at the Secretariat level. This assessment does not deny the efforts undertaken by OSCE institutions or the Secretariat, but mainly refers to the tempo and quality of reactions to negative developments in and around Ukraine. The quite destructive role of a number of OSCE participating States that wanted to block some productive initiatives also needs to be recognized. Many of the problems relate to the lack of adequate institutional capacity of the OSCE, because participating States for many years could not agree on necessary reforms, tolerating possible inefficiencies of the OSCE in critical situations. Therefore, Ukraine doubts that the OSCE can help settle the war and conflict with Russia. This negative attitude is less visible by people or organizations who have co-operated with the OSCE in different formats or been confronted with its activities – they have had possibilities to see the concrete impact of OSCE activities. However, the OSCE has not sufficiently promoted its results (even if moderate) and their practical value to key stakeholders inside Ukraine, especially to wider Ukrainian society. On the other hand Ukrainian authorities and society have expected much more clarity (i.e. on stating the facts and identifying the perpetrators without using general diplomatic phrases) and prompt reaction from OSCE representatives (either in the SMM or the office in Kyiv) to the violations from the Russian side (including its puppets in Donetsk and Luhansk). It may be these expectations were too high for OSCE staff because of the Organization’s general policy to be viewed as a neutral and impartial actor (in order to keep Russia on board), but this also damaged the Organization’s image.